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‘Loverboy’ Grooming in the Netherlands, a Clash of Moral Panics

Loverboy

There’s a curious difference between Britain and the Netherlands regarding grooming gangs (known euphemistically as ‘Loverboys’), and that is that, in the Netherlands, it has been reported on since the mid to late 1990s, gaining it’s term ‘Loverboy’ in 1997, while public anger, possibly precisely because it hasn’t been covered up, appears to be much lower. While the subject might even urge apolitical, self-identifying liberals to state “Put them against the wall”, it is curious how little sway it has held in public and political debate. It is worth noting then, what the initial reaction to the phenomenon was by those stalwart defenders of justice and honesty: the ivory tower leftist academic. As intellectual justification for un-noticing requires by definition, what becomes apparent is a myopic framework to see less:

“For decades, the lack of investigation was presented as a reason to have no investigation at all. Refusal to acknowledge the possibility of a problem, because the problem was not confirmed by socially acceptable sources. The very media platforms which perpetuated the idea that to even consider the problem was evil.”

In this article I will take a look at the paper “News coverage on loverboys comes from a small sample-selection”, (Peter Burger and Willem Koetsenruijter). It illustrates some commonly seen fallacious reasoning employed to downplay migrant-crime, but more notably creates an intellectual framework within which thorough research and analysis give an objective credence to less concrete claims. The paper’s main focus is on the increase in reporting on the phenomenon, the sources informing the reporting, and general considerations on newsgathering and newsreporting, and the role newsmedia plays in creating a worldview in conjunction with influential interest groups. While the source analysis is perfectly valid within the framework of the article, it is the chosen perspective informing this very framework, as is its overall tone, which suggests a priority to ‘protect’ non-white minorities by casting doubt on reporting on the issue. It’s main argument, which is supported by its analysis, is that the reporting has relied on under-varied sources. The lack of said statistical sources, however, is not considered as having created a necessity for Dutch news-media to over-rely on what sources are available, which weakens the referenced claim put forward by Bovenkerk ‘loverboys’ are a form of moral panic. The claim the paper puts forward, to say ‘moral entrepreneurs’ exploit the lack of data for their own agenda, ascribes an unsound motivation on those raising the issue in the media. This assertion relies on nothing more than the conjecture: sources presented and gathered have lacked academic research, or over-relied on victims, social workers and interest groups, ergo those most prolific in broadcasting and addressing the issue are using the ‘moral panic’ (as is asserted the reaction to the phenomenon is) for their own ends. In this article, I seek not to relay a chronological order of the arguments proposed, and facts put forward, but rather highlight (at times questionable) reasoning, assertions and curious points. This is to illustrate  how spurious claims can be made innocently, or hidden consciously, by employing and working within frameworks and perspectives, which follow the (moral) priority of claims-makers. This raises the questions: do the authors critique the over and under representation of certain sources, or is the critique and its framework intended to castigate media for reporting on a phenomenon at all? And does the paper itself adhere to the objectivity and epistemological standards it demands of its subject? As the authors put forward suggestions and claims on the underlying moral motivation of those raising the issue, I shall see if I can divine an underlying moral motivation on their part in kind. This is, after all, an opinion piece, and not an academic paper.

Moral Panic

“Onze inhoudsanalyse van claims en claimsmakers
in Nederlandse kranten ondersteunt de interpretatie van Bovenkerk e.a. (2006) die de reactie op
loverboys beschrijven als een morele paniek.”

“ook concluderen Bovenkerk en de zijnen dat het aantal gevallen
van meisjes in Amsterdam die voor de prostitutie geworven worden, betrekkelijk klein
is en dat ‘het klassieke loverboyverhaal zoals we dat kennen uit de media, in de praktijk
maar zelden voorkomt.’ (2006:214)
Toch worden er tal van maatregelen genomen die juist uitgaan van de realiteit van dat klassieke
verhaal. De Overzichtsgids preventieprojecten loverboyproblematiek van de GGD Amsterdam
(2005-6) beschrijft 23 preventieprojecten met een landelijk of Amsterdams-regionaal bereik.
Interactieve theatervoorstellingen, brochures en leskisten zijn op aanvraag beschikbaar om
leerlingen voor te lichten over de gevaren van loverboys.
Dat invloedrijke klassieke verhaal is onder meer verbreid via de media, waarop wij nu onze
aandacht richten.
Onderzoeksvraag
Hoewel Bovenkerk e.a. (2006) pleiten voor een ‘symmetrische’ studie van het fenomeen
loverboys en de reacties daarop, laten ze een formeel onderzoek naar de rol van de media
achterwege. Een inhoudsanalyse van nieuwsitems over loverboys zou licht moeten kunnen
werpen op die rol. Als onderzoeksvraag formuleerden we daarom: welke partijen voeren de
nieuwsmedia op om iets te zeggen over de omvang van het verschijnsel loverboy? We hebben
ons daarbij niet beperkt tot de geschreven pers, maar de vraag ook gesteld aan een
corpus televisie-uitzendingen.”

It’s main assertion is that, as argued by Bovenkerk (2006), the authors consider the reaction and reporting on the loverboy phenomenon as a form of ‘moral panic‘, and that this is perpetrated and exploited by ‘moral entrepeneurs’. The assertion the issue of ‘loverboys’ has become a moral panic, is argued by Bovenkerk, from which informs the perspective of Peter Burger and Willem Koetsenruijter to consider the alleged role of Dutch newsmedia in bringing this about. ‘Moral panic’ is defined as a social problem becoming widely accepted as an issue, disproportionately to the scale of the problem. It goes on to state Bovenkerk and others consider the loverboy phenomenon as such a moral panic, but stress this doesn’t exclude the existence of a problem, going on to state studies on moral panic focus on the reactions to the phenomenon, and largely ignore the underlying cause of the phenomenon itself. While our current knowledge indicates that, if anything, a moral panic was, and is, lacking, Bovenkerk’s approach does indicate a search for accuracy, rather than silencing, whether his research accurately perceived and predicted the scale of the problem or not. However, the authors note Bovenkerk “and his” have neglected to focus on the role the media has played in creating the moral panic. The perspective is then to subject reporting on the issue to analysis; flaws can always be found, but sources omitting the topic, or neglecting to mention the ethnicity of the perpetrators, will not be noted. Rather, the authors will note what references there are of ethnicity, as being damning in and of itself.

The main focus of the paper, and its analysis, is on the sources gathered in order to report on the phenomenon. While the analysis itself is solid, it is the framework and double standards used to downplay the phenomenon that bear a closer look.

To make the claim of ‘moral panic’, we must rely on the assertion that the problem is being overblown. This ultimately relies on a lack of data. As you cannot prove a negative, it appears self-evident we must act as if the data available tells us the entire scale of the problem. This would be true in a truly rational and empirical-driven society, however, this ignores the role the orthodox morality plays in omitting and discouraging whistleblowing on issues that don’t fit the dominant narrative. We can observe the ‘success’ this social dynamic has had in Britain, where a similar problem of an even larger scale was hidden and denied for so long. The British press certainly wasn’t guilty of creating a moral panic for the past decades, will the authors praise them for this effort? The authors are also well aware how social pressure dissuades people from speaking out when it suits their own perspective:

“De constructie van het loverboysprobleem is nog niet afgesloten. Als we alleen naar de
media kijken, lijkt dat anders, omdat daarin nauwelijks sceptici aan het woord komen. Die
hebben dan ook weinig te winnen bij publiciteit, omdat de promotors van het loverboysprobleem
alle tegenargumenten kunnen aftroeven door de slachtofferkaart te spelen.”

Which states skeptics have little to win in appearing in public debate, because the ‘promoters’ of the issue can trounce all counter-arguments with the victim-card. Yet I detect a similar motivation where it concerns ‘victim groups’ (non-whites):

“Ook trof ons de sensationele en racistische woordkeus (‘seksslavin’, ‘blanke slavin’).”

“Verder wordt in de media wordt nogal eens de indruk gewekt dat het hier vooral zou gaan om Marokkaanse mannen.”

“Also the sensational and racist choice of words “sexslave’, ‘white slave”, stood out to us”.

“In addition, the media has a tendency to give the impression it would mainly concern men of Moroccan descent”.

I will come back to these points later, on the point of ascribing motivations and roles of ‘moral entrepeneur’ to spokespersons, broadcasters, and interest groups. For now, I would draw attention to various instances and reasoning on the topic of “influential” subjects, who have media access, and can push for a positive spin on reporting, while others have to settle for merely being subjects:

“En al eerder maakten Ericson e.a., die een groot etnografisch onderzoek uitvoerden naar
misdaadnieuws in Toronto, een onderscheid tussen access en coverage: sommige personen en
organisaties hebben toegang tot de media en zijn in staat aan nieuws over hen een gunstige
draai te geven, anderen moeten genoegen nemen met het feit dat de media over hen berichten,
maar kunnen daarop zelf geen invloed uitoefenen. (Ericson e.a., 1989:5-6)”

Here a ethnographic research project is referenced to illustrate the point. Whether this was meant to assume non-white ethnicities lack interest groups and agency to promote positive reporting is not spelled out. The perspective and tone of the paper hints the non-white lacking-agency/victim narrative is assumed true without question.

“De bliksemcarrière van de loverboyskwestie is vruchtbaar te beschrijven vanuit theorievorming
over de constructie van sociale problemen, zoals voor het eerst onder woorden
gebracht door Berger en Luckman (1966). De theorie stelt grofweg dat sociale problemen
geen objectieve gegevenheden zijn, maar strikt genomen pas ontstaan als invloedrijke personen
of groepen – claimsmakers ─ er met succes in slagen de omstandigheden als zodanig
te definiëren. (Spector & Kitsuse, 1977)
De zogenaamde loverboytactiek om meisjes in te palmen en te prostitueren is een nieuwe
vorm van misdaad (Best, 1999), die net als ‘zinloos geweld’ en ‘eerwraak’ niet voorkomt in
het Wetboek van Strafrecht. Politie en justitie houden er niet systematisch statistieken over
bij (Bovenkerk e.a., 2005:70-73; Van Dijke en Terpstra, 2005) en er is weinig wetenschappelijk
onderzoek naar verricht (Bovenkerk e.a. 2006:26-31). Dat geeft moral entrepreneurs alle
ruimte om hun claims te promoten, onder andere in de nieuwsmedia.”

Through the lens of ‘moral panic’ and ‘moral entrepeneurs’, it notes the subjective nature of social problems, and how these only become concepts when influential people or (interest) groups becomes successful in defining social issues as such. I look forward to reading their work on the moral panic of ‘white privilege’. It then uses Bovenkerk’s work to state Police and justice departments, two sources the paper claims are lacking in proportion in reporting on the issue, do not keep systematic statistics on the issue, as these are “new forms of crime” like ‘senseless violence’ and ‘honour-violence’. The lack of academic research gives ‘moral entrepeneurs’ all the space they need to promote their claims, so claims the paper.

It is worth noting that both the scale of the problem, and public anger (the dreaded ‘moral panic’) has not, as far as we can tell, reached the levels we see in Britain today. In particular the anger over arrest and imprisonment of Tommy Robinson, suggests adhering to the taboo of ‘racism’ only leads to far more volatile scenarios. Further indications of downplaying problems which arrive from multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies find fruition in the paper, when it suddenly becomes acceptable to build a case with the only sources available. The following rhetoric will seem familiar:

“Toch zijn mannen die hun partner in de prostitutie laten werken zo oud als de
prostitutie zelf. Bovenkerk e.a. noemen tal van historische parallellen als bloedpooiers en voosbinkies
om aan te tonen dat het verschijnsel minstens honderd jaar oud is (2006:48-56). En
in een opiniestuk in NRC Handelsblad (15 okt. 2005) wordt zelfs Moenen, de duivel die in
het middeleeuwse toneelstuk Mariken van Nimwegen verleidt, aangeduid als een loverboy.
We hebben het dan over een tekst van omstreeks 1500.”

It makes the well known argument that the phenomenon existed before (so don’t notice the increase and specific nature as it exists today). It obviously contradicts the point that, like ‘honour-violence’ and ‘senseless violence’, these are supposedly new crimes, though I imagine the authors will argue that these crimes are only deemed noteworthy because they have become named and linked to non-whites. What stands out especially, given the core of the paper, which is its analysis on a lack of source-variety, is that this claim relies on available historical sources, not the full scope of sources ideally available. It even notes an opinion piece in the NRC (imagine a fusion between the BBC and the Guardian, in Dutch), which described a character in a medieval play as essentially being a ‘loverboy’. The paper later notes a film, used to teach teenagers about the dangers of loverboys, is a fictional film.

 

Moral Entrepreneurs

Whereas the assertion the ‘loverboy’ phenomenon is a moral panic, plausibly argued via a breakdown of the sources referred to:

It is the claim of ‘moral entrepeneurs’ exploiting the issue where the illusion of precision via numerical data is employed to give credence to more assumptious assertions.

“Kijken we nu naar de analyse van de televisie-uitzendingen (figuur 5). In het corpus van 33
tv-items valt op dat de EO zich erg heeft ingespannen om het probleem op de agenda te
zetten. In de onderzochte periode werden 7 (21%) van de 33 uitzendingen verzorgd door
de EO, een aantal waarbij alle andere omroepen achterblijven. Kijken we bovendien naar
de jaren 1997-2002, de fase waarin het loverboysprobleem ‘doorbrak’, dan zien we dat niet
minder dan 6 van de 15 uitzendingen op het conto staan van de EO.”

Figuur 5. Aandeel van de publieke omroepen in tv-uitzendingen over loverboys, 1997 t/m 2005 (N=33).
Omroep Aantal uitzendingen
EO 7
NOS / NPS 5
TROS 5
VARA 4
KRO/NCRV 3
IKON 2
NMO 2
HUMA 1
MAX 1
NOT 1
NPS 1
VPRO 1
Totaal aantal 33

In de 33 uitzendingen tellen wij 103 sprekers, niet meegerekend: presentatoren en anonieme
vox pop ─ straatinterviews en studiopubliek (zie figuur 6). Ook hier vormen hulpverleners
de grootste groep die aan het woord komt: 30 personen, 35%. Daarna volgen de
slachtoffers (28) en hun familie (13). Te verwaarlozen is de rol van politie en justitie (4
woordvoerders), politici (4) en daders (1 persoon). De wetenschap is in tien jaar publieke
televisie over loverboys vertegenwoordigd door één onafhankelijke onderzoekster. In de
voorbereidende vergaderingen van 33 uitzendingen is minstens 33 keer de vraag gesteld:
‘Wie nodigen we uit om over loverboys te praten?’ En één keer in tien jaar tijd heeft dat
geresulteerd in een wetenschappelijk onderzoeker op tv.”

The notable role of the EO (Evangelical Broadcaster) becomes apparent, having broadcasted reports and programs on the issue 7 times (making up 21% of total reporting), in particular during the time-period in which the problem went viral.

“valt op dat de EO zich erg heeft ingespannen om het probleem op de agenda tezetten.”

“It stands out that the EO has put in much effort to put the problem on the agend.” A fair point on the overall coverage on the issue, is the singular appearance of a “Wetenschappelijk” (litterally translated as science, better understood in the anglo-sphere in the German “Wissenschaft”) researcher in a 10 year period.

Some other reservations that deserve acknowledgment:

“De auteurs onderzochten de prostitutie van minderjarige meisjes en kwamen
tot een schatting van tussen de 1000 en 2000 meisjes die zeker of vermoedelijk in een
bepaald jaar in de prostitutie werkten. Bovenkerk e.a. berekenen: 20 procent van totaal aantal
slachtoffer werkte voor loverboys, dus tussen de 200 en 400. (2006:70).”

Consulted research by Bovenkerk, who puts forward that in a given year, with 1000 to 2000 underage girls working in prostitution, 20% would be accurately categorized as ‘loverboy’ cases. Assuming these numbers are accurate, neither the full scale of underage prostitution is in question, but the migrant involvement could have been believed to be smaller to what was presented at the time. As long as the presumption is made that there is no migrant involvement outside of the particular ‘loverboy’ phenomenon, within underage prostitution.

“Harde cijfers ontbreken dus. En omdat die harde cijfers ontbreken, kunnen claimsmakers
het belang van de zaak vergroten door te reppen van ‘het topje van de ijsberg’ en het
enorme dark number dat er moet zijn, een claim die vaak gemaakt wordt over zedenmisdrijven
(Bovenkerk e.a. 2006:266-267; Best 2001)”

“Hard numbers are lacking, and thus claim-makers can exaggerate the importance of the issue by speaking of a “tip of the iceberg”, and the enormous dark number there must be, a claim often made in delinquency offenses.” Note the recurring point of demanding hard numbers, yet the lack of consideration why hard numbers are hard to come by in a society where noticing crimes against whites itself is demonised. To put this into perspective, it must be acknowledged that the political correct cathedral in the post-Fortuyn Netherlands was severely shaken, and it is possible the authors simply didn’t consider the role the preceding taboo had played in obscuring numbers, and the legacy of number-lacking it might still have entailed at the time the paper was written. Also note per capita is omitted, when hard numbers are demanded.

There appears to be a prioritising to demand hard numbers before action or noticing takes place, while preventing, or decreasing, a tangible, if hard to estimate, problem that is particularly vile. This is used to cast doubt on the issue as a whole. It is to paint an issue as something only the gullible and backwards care about. It is to be a moral entrepreneur, by attempting to create a moral panic, when the narrative of the left-wing cathedral is threatened. Do I have a harder case for this accusation than the authors themselves? Recall:

“Ook trof ons de sensationele en racistische woordkeus (‘seksslavin’, ‘blanke slavin’).”

“Verder wordt in de media wordt nogal eens de indruk gewekt dat het hier vooral zou gaan om Marokkaanse mannen.”

“Also the sensational and racist choice of words “sexslave’, ‘white slave”, stood out to us”.

“In addition, the media has a tendency to give the impression it would mainly concern men of Moroccan descent”.

In the very least, this hints at a priority to prevent public anger towards non-white minorities, over tackling non-whites sexually exploiting white girls. The twitter page of one of the authors, amidst pointing out a-political hoaxes, jumps on every hoax anti-migrant platforms pump out. Pro-migrant hoaxes and confusion, however, are not deemed worthy of attention, with one unique exception on a far-fetched racist bus-driver fabrication:

But to summarize the tone of Burger’s profile in a single tweet:

“Human races don’t exist, racism does. You are spreading unsound stereotypes about Arabs”. Sadly, this statement is such a mess, that it takes far more words to untangle it than it took Burger to tweet it. Though the “Islam isn’t a race” cop-out has become tiresome, Burger’s refusal to engage honestly shines the usual light on the typical transparent mental gymnastics . Note that in response to the “What race am I talking about (what race is Muslim?)”, Burger’s reaction omits the straightforward logic of the point, claims human races don’t exist, but racism does, followed by the assertion that joking about a (debunked)  anti-Muslim hoax, is spreading unsound stereotypes about Arabs. If races don’t exist, and racism is an arbitrary form of discriminating between groups of people, why does he feel the need to conflate the (vulgar) Muslim-joke with Arabs? If races don’t exist, couldn’t he just claim that the Muslim focus is as racist as the asserted Arab focus, both ultimately being some form of social construct? Or was it to avoid the “acceptable” excuse to criticise a religion? These are the tiresome non-arguments you have to deal with if you fear the scarlet R.

Though dishonest or confused in twitter spats,  a quick scan shows me only one tweeted article containing inaccuracies:

A few examples of inaccurate reporting in the article include:

“Peter Sweden, a notorious “English” extremist.
Prison Planet, a site belonging to “Alt-right-vlogger” and conspiracy-theorist Paul Joseph Watson.
Jack Posobiec, an American “Alt-right“-journalist.”

In addition, the article repeatedly claims Jared Taylor is a racist, rather than a race-realist, “one of the most ‘notorious’ racists in America” “Calls for a revolt.”

The impression is not one who actively, or consiously, lies and hypocritically accuses his ideological opponents, but rather one who, in the rising tide of migrant-reporting, continues to snipe hoaxes, in order to discredit the overall reality. The ideologically driven perspective becomes apparent in the need for mental gymnastics, and targeting specifically counter-migrant and counter-islam hoaxes. We’re all moral and political activists, when it comes down to it, though it is only one side who lectures at universities, and keeps up the pretense of objectivity in blatantly obvious partisanship. But there is no hypocrisy regarding accuracy. He is merely using the ammunition false reporting and ill-conceived hoaxes on the part of his opponent provide. This does mean, however, that he is engaging in the role of moral entrepreneur, attempting to put forward a world-view according to his own moral drives.

Some curious focus, besides a pro-migrant/pro-minority perspective, it is the framing of the presumed “moral entrepeneurs.’ The conclusion, as follows from the source analysis, is the prolific role of the EO (Evangelical broadcast) and members of interest groups. One line in particular stand out:

“Harde cijfers ontbreken dus. En omdat die harde cijfers ontbreken, kunnen claimsmakers
het belang van de zaak vergroten door te reppen van ‘het topje van de ijsberg’ en het
enorme dark number dat er moet zijn, een claim die vaak gemaakt wordt over zedenmisdrijven
(Bovenkerk e.a. 2006:266-267; Best 2001)”

“Toos Heemskerk is de meest gevraagde woordvoerster voor het Scharlaken Koord, een organisatie
die vanuit christelijke bewogenheid op de Wallen aan hulpverlening en zending
(check) doet. Geven ook voorlichting via internet en op scholen: project Beware of Loverboys.
Hier iets over hun opvatting over seksualiteit?”

“Here something about their views on sexuality.” Interesting.

Note the disdain for alarm on sex-crimes, presumed to be the arena of “moral entrepreneurs’. Note the view of those raising alarm “Here something on their views on sexuality.” Bovenkerk’s definition of moral panic, and a call for research and proportionate response, has transformed into the presumptuous claim Christian morality, regarding sex, is driving a push to exaggerate sex-crimes against minors. Let’s say this assumption is true. I will freely make assumptions on the authors’ motivations in kind. What emerges is the convulsive moral drive of the liberal left, with its history of sexual liberation, and trivialising sex as a means to this end, to consider alarm raising on sexual-exploitation to be alarmism. Taboo on sex are seen as irrational and outmoded. Possibly it is the assumption: Christianity calls for sexual moderation, Christianity is not objectively true, ergo taboos on sexuality are factually false. Which would ignore the common theme in human cultures and religions to moderate or steer sex. Perhaps it is merely the endless push for liberation, all sexual barriers being oppressive. It might be the faux-rationalisation: girls after their first period can become pregnant, ergo it is natural for them to have sex at this age, ignoring puberty as a transition stage. Maybe it’s all of these things combined. The curious thing is how the authors, in their influential role to shape narratives and worldviews, appear completely unaware they are acting as moral agents, or moral entrepreneurs, asserting their own moral views are rational without having to go through the trouble of arguing why their morals are fit for this world; an assumptions the imagined rationality of their ideology makes it a ontological morality. The question between their morals, and those of the Evangelical, is: what is their purpose? Which morals are lacking today? Given the topic, the moral impulse of the evangelicals to raise alarm, even if it were truly accurately defined as ‘moral panic’, would appear to be in greater demand than the morals of the ivory tower, which essentially argues nothing should be done or said until it provides the research it was loathe, and too late, to do.

While the intellectual framework appears ideology driven, and engages is fallacious reasoning, it is given the credence of rationality via objective analysis. Questions of the larger picture, “are there racial or cultural differences that could cause this phenomenon? Has the orthodox morality, further enforced by the influential party of the ivory tower, made it harder to spot these problems in time? Has this orthodox morality prevented parents and society to sufficiently instill a sense in the victims themselves to avoid these scenarios? The tunnel-vision on possible-inaccuracies of media-reporting, with the accuracy of the minute, is wielded, to justify deeming the conception of the problem a moral panic. The larger reality was to be ignored, requiring a focus not on the reality, but on the uncertain nature in observing reality. Yet, time has now told us there are a thousand annual victims per year, mainly by Moroccans, Turks, Caribbeans, and Roma.

In conclusion, the roles and shapes of ‘moral panic’ and ‘moral entrepreneurs’ are illustrated in this paper far beyond the argument it puts forward. The post-Fortuyn Netherlands, a phase of breaking political-correct taboos, severely shook the left-wing Cathedral, urging its clergy and adherents to find rational explanations in what their morality allowed to be perceived. Between the moral drive of the Christian evangelical to raise alarm on sex-crime, and the moral drive of the liberal left to trivialise sex, and deny problems arising from multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies, this paper illustrates two moral panics colliding. As such, I do not believe the authors have set up the intellectual framework to consciously obscure the problem of grooming, or ‘loverboys’, rather the impression emerges of a moral impulse which dictates a overconfident intellect to only think and see according to its underlying morality. “A clever mind can think in very myopic terms, precisely because it believes it can achieve absolute clarity. Myopia is a trap for pure intellect.” In the face of the multi-cultural dream falling apart, and the break-down of moral defenses against hostile sexual conquest and exploitation, I conclude that the “prudish” morality, shaped by the test of time of the Christians and evangelicals proves closer to truth than the morality informing the authors, which is shaped by mere intellect, what it cannot explain a priori proven a posteriori: the role of moral norms become apparent when moral norms are broken down.

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