At the present moment, our (Europeans’) prospects for the future appear incredibly bleak. It is superfluous here to diagnose the predicament facing Europe; we are all acutely aware of the situation. More pertinent would be to address the problem in how we’re dealing with this situation, for we are presently failing to meet the challenges being posed to us by our various opponents. Since the era of globalisation, perhaps post-1990 and beyond, the opponents of the New World Order haven’t presented a unified message – far from it. Instead, we’ve worked within our own cliques and niches, clinging to a multitude of failed ideas from the early 20th century. This isn’t isolated to the right, either, for leftists, in desperately retaining their various esoteric factions of Marxism-Leninism, have also failed to address the problems of modernism from their standpoint. This failure of all globalism’s opponents has permitted international liberalism to reign supreme.
The closest semblance of unity on the right came from the post-war movement “Europe a Nation”, led by Sir Oswald Mosley and his continental counterparts, which sought to present a unified, pan-European alternative to the neo-liberal world order. Whilst promising, this didn’t gain traction due to nationalism’s tendency to retreat within its own national sensibility and erect barriers between itself and foreign counterparts. Equally important for the demise of this project has been the emergence of the European Union, a globalist project which has unfortunately made European unity synonymous with the neo-liberal world order. And so we now find nationalist politics in disarray, with very little ideological uniformity between national groupings that need to form a united front in order to overcome a thoroughly united and seemingly omnipotent enemy.
Whilst this assessment of our failures largely presupposes certain options are implausible, it’s worth analysing them for their merits nonetheless. One such suggestion, clearly the most popular amongst nationalist-minded activists in Europe today, is the reversion to what is often derided as the 19th century nation-state model. This rather self-explanatory idea suggests that we reject supranational entities and return to pre-1945 arrangements whereby each of the various European nation states is fully sovereign and governed by nationalist politicians, with inward looking domestic policies and competitive foreign policy. A quaint suggestion, but one fraught with danger.
Given the disparities between European nation states in terms of simple land mass, economic power, natural resources and so on, we will always find ourselves in a situation whereby various “spheres of influence” emerge. As we saw in the 20th century, the logical conclusion of such a scenario is competition and war between nations. Furthermore, it fails to address the fact that our enemies do not recognise geographical boundaries and so will be positively enamoured by being presented with a ready-made divide-and-conquer model. But of course, such projects also depend on basic feasibility and, clearly, this policy’s ability to become reality is almost non-existent. In the first instance, it depends upon the peoples of Europe spontaneously turning to nationalism independently of one another, and moreover the existence of the political will to ensure the necessary changes are made. Unlikely, in the extreme, especially when one considers the unassailable power of the United States in the realms of underhand diplomacy (forcing nationalist-minded regimes to soften their approach of face disposition). Finally, we have the not-so-small issue of our nations being overloaded with newcomers from the Third World, whose birth rates make it increasingly less likely that nationalist-minded politicians could come to power in certain countries. All told, it’s an idealistic but entirely unworkable proposition that, in many ways, is also undesirable given the age-old failings of such a system.
A theory that has gained traction in various intellectual circles of both the right and left is something called “ethnopluralism”. It suggests a model based on Balkanisation, whereby the various irreconcilable ethno-cultural groups residing within national boundaries could be given self-determination and control over their own territories, resources and administration within a given region. So, for instance, within Germany we might have an Arab homeland, an African homeland, a Germanic homeland and so on, each governed by and for its own people. Whilst this often feels like conceding defeat, it’s entirely more plausible than the nation-state proposal for it entails fewer unpalatable ideas. Additionally, it may be something proposed by non-native groups in the future, or even by our own establishments when the realisation dawns upon them that their multi-racial utopian experiment is doomed to failure. Furthermore, it would enable us to preserve our right to perpetuate our ethno-cultural groupings within a controlled environment, free from the globalist pressures to mix and commit ethnic suicide.
The downsides of ethnopluralism are fairly obvious. First, it involves us, the native Europeans, ceding considerable territory and resources to those not of our kind, thereby depriving ourselves of material potential that is (or should be) our birth-right. Then there’s the fact that such an arrangement would be transient, before one faction or another gets designs on another’s territory and/or resources. Third problem: who would be the ultimate arbiter of disputes? Would there be an all-powerful centralised state to deal with matters at a federal level and, if so, how would representation to such a body be decided? Lastly, the difficulties surrounding the creation of such zones of habitation are manifold, such as the organisation of population transfers and the willingness of its participants to be involved in such an experiment. There are a multitude of native liberals to whom this suggestion would be unthinkable, given their steadfast belief in this multicultural dystopian utopia – the obvious issue here is that these liberals currently occupy the corridors of power in Western nations!
Another suggestion that’s popular amongst the identitarian groups of Europe is something akin to Mosley’s “Europe a Nation”, but without the fascistic undertones. Their ideas, largely based on Guillaume Faye’s theories, consider propositions like a new, Imperial Europe, united and ethnocentric, developing Autarky of Great Spaces in a united, transcontinental zone transparently named Eurosiberia. Such a Europe would be governed on a continental level by an Imperial government, whilst the various ethno-cultural sub-regions of Europe would have considerable autonomy over their own affairs. So for instance, we would no longer have England, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, but Eurosiberia and, within that, Wessex, Northumbria, Brittany, Holland, Gaul and so on. This allegedly respects ethno-cultural differences allowing each to survive and prosper, whilst all are offered the protection of a strong, centralised Eurosiberian state.
This notion is groundbreaking in that it demonstrates nationalists seeking to renounce their quaint 19th century notions of the sovereign nation state. It recognises that the transnational nature of our enemies gives rise to the need for a supranational solution, one which is both powerful in the face of external pressure and protective of its internal diversity. It is also more likely to come to pass, given that the infrastructure for a united, Imperial Europe already exists in the shape of the European Union; all that would be required for this to become reality is the usurpation of existing institutions by a majority of nationalist minded politicians from around Europe. If they were to gain control of the European parliament, for instance, this could quite feasibly become reality. However, we are still faced with two main problems; firstly, it presupposes that those presently in control of Europe’s institutions will willingly hand over their precious project to the nasty fascists – an unlikely scenario; secondly, we still have to contend with the many millions of foreigners in our midst. On this latter point, Faye and others have suggested repatriation, although many are vague about the logistics of this and the feasibility thereof in the face of pressure from external, powerful forces. That said, this is presently amongst the leading contenders when analysing which solutions would be most likely to succeed in the short- to medium-term future.
A final proposition, and one which requires some careful further development, is that of Eurasia and the multipolar world. If we consider that Washington is the beacon of liberalism, and will be forevermore, along with its vassals emanating from Brussels, then we are to deduce that Moscow is the beacon of traditionalism along with the other spaces within its sphere of influence. This will likely be the case for the foreseeable long-term future, and the likelihood of success in trying to change the fundamental nature of these two beacons is very slim indeed. Therefore, the logical conclusion is simply to relocate to within the sphere of influence that best suits one’s worldview. That means, of course, that the majority of Europeans, being liberals, will remain within the Washington-amplifier’s (Brussels) sphere of influence and slowly but surely accept their ethno-cultural demise. That’s fine, we cannot force those who have succumbed to materialistic nihilism to embrace a way of life alien to their corrupted sensibilities.
This does mean, however, that those of us who wish a different future may achieve it by relocating to Moscow’s sphere of influence. Such an idea could take two separate and very different formats; 1. Relocation to an existing state such as Hungary, integrating and assimilating into their way of life. This means forsaking one’s own cultural identity for the preservation of the race. 2. Migrating to an uninhabited region of Russia’s great spaces, bringing our different ethnocultural heritages with us, and developing autonomous regions within the sphere of influence and protection of Moscow. This first suggestion is fairly self-explanatory and thus requires not further elaboration here. The second, however, is nascent and delicate and requires further development in other written works. What is important to note is Moscow’s willingness for this to happen. It has, for instance, offered extremely cheap farmland to Englishmen in an attempt to encourage collective migrations from here to there, with no inference that the pioneer’s native culture should be left behind. Equally, Moscow have offered asylum to South Africa’s European farmers who, one supposes, would be free to develop autonomous communities in Russia’s more sparsely populated territories. Of course, this requires taxation on a federal level and allegiance to Moscow, but in return a segment of one’s ethno-cultural identity could be preserved under the protection of a state focused on traditionalism.
This final option, as it has been stated, requires much further development. But it does look promising and entirely plausible, provided Moscow retains its willingness to support such a thing – one cannot understand why it would retract this, given the increase in power projection that additional manpower would provide. All told, it is emerging as the most feasible option for European nationalists, for it simply involves moving; it’s not recreating the wheel or infiltrating a gigantic state apparatus or starting from scratch.
Despite this, ethnopluralism and Eurosiberia remain options that should be left on the table. The future, at this point in time, is deeply troubling and obviously uncertain, therefore we would be foolish to commit all our eggs to one basket. We can already discount this quaint notion of sovereign nation states, something that divisive American Alt-Right thinker Richard Spencer (probably correctly) dubbed “Hobbit Nationalism” – it has failed us and, in many ways, directly led to our present situation. Therefore, we must involve our inherent European creativity in our quest for a solution to these problems. We must also ensure that any solution involves Europeans as a collective, as opposed to fractured and disunited entities fighting for irreconcilably different agendas; Italy cannot succeed if its interests directly oppose Sweden, or vice versa. These axioms broaden our gaze, for we can discard tried and failed agendas, replacing them with creative solutions to modern problems. Most importantly, we must be aware that such options are on the table and, with all the creative intelligence at our disposal, seriously consider and develop each one to find the most suitable. Our very existence as a people, quite literally, depends on this.
 Europe a Nation was a policy presented by Mosley and his European National Party colleagues across the continent, which envisaged a Europe united along liens much the same as the present European Union. The difference being, of course, that such a Europe would reject international finance and the global melting pot of races and cultures vastly different from one another.
 Whenever Europe is divided into its miniscule nations, invariably they fall under the German or Anglo-French spheres of influence. This created much tension between those Western nations and “Mitteleuropa” in times gone by, as we all know, to devastating effect.
 Until recently, this was the stated policy of the Sweden Democrats. They abandoned this in their quest to “moderate” and gain parliamentary power.
 Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin’s adaptation of Faye’s (and the French New Right’s) Eurosiberia proposition.
 Including India, China and the remainder of Northern Asia within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, the loose successor of the Soviet Union).
 Hungary has previously noted its willingness to take refugees (native Europeans) fleeing multiculturalism. Poland has taken millions of Ukrainian nationals fleeing the civil war.
 English expression.